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Abstract:  This article examines a conspicuous disconnect between the prevalent 
Russian and European narratives on the costs and benefits of federalism.   The 
observed variation in dominant discursive frameworks can be attributed to distinct 
historical experiences, especially in the area of centralization and power-sharing.  
Attitudes toward federalism have also been affected by the trajectory of institutional 
development.   In the EU case, federalism implies a qualitative institutional 
transformation, entailing political unification and the surrender of national 
sovereignty to an external, supra-national formation.  To individual member-states, 
federalism is a challenge from above, which may make the government less 
responsive and exacerbate the already existing democratic deficit.  In contrast, 
Russian federalism has been a question of dividing power and autonomy between the 
central and regional governments, rather than an external challenge to national 
sovereignty.  Correspondingly, post-communist federalization has become associated 
with ad hoc bargaining, fragmentation, abuse of power, and encroachments on the 
national jurisdiction – all emanating from below. 
The contrasting nature of prior and ongoing federalist projects in the EU and Russia 
matters: the Western perspective is less sympathetic to the priorities of Russia’s 
centralization reforms, because they are viewed as amplifying democratic deficit in 
the regions without enhancing democracy at the national level.  
Key words:  federalism; decentralization; democracy; Russia; European Union 
 
Résumé: Cet article examine un décalage apparent entre les récits répandus russes et 
européens sur les coûts et les avantages du fédéralisme. La variation observée dans les 
cadres discursifs dominants peut être attribuée à des expériences historiques distinctes, 
                                                        
1 Ph.D., Adjunct Professor, School of Public and International Affairs, North Carolina State University. Research 
interests: Post-communist democratization and federalization; intergovernmental bargaining; institutional theory; 
political culture and preference formation. Address: Department of Political Science, Caldwell Hall 212, Box 8105, 
NCSU, Raleigh, NC 27605. E-mail: dmitin@ncsu.edu. 
* Received 23 August 2009;  accepted 17 November 2009 
Dmitri Mitin/Cross-cultural Communication   Vol.5, No.4, 2009   1-9 
2 
en particulier dans le domaine de la centralisation et du partage du pouvoir. Les 
attitudes à l'égard du fédéralisme ont également été affectées par la trajectoire du 
développement institutionnel. Dans le cas de l'UE, le fédéralisme implique une 
transformation institutionnelle qualitative, en imposant l'unification politique et 
l'abandon de la souveraineté nationale à un organisme supra-national extérieur. Pour 
chaque état membre, le fédéralisme est une défi venat du haut, qui pourrait rendre le 
gouvernement moins réactif et exacerbe le déficit démocratique qui existe déjà. En 
revanche, le fédéralisme russe a été une question du partage de pouvoir et 
d'autonomie entre les gouvernements centraux et régionaux, plutôt qu’ un défit 
externe à l’égard de la souveraineté nationale. De même, la fédéralisation 
post-communiste est devenue associée à la négociation ad hoc, à la fragmentation, à 
l'abus de pouvoir, ainsi qu’aux empiètements sur la juridiction nationale - tout 
émanant de dessous. 
La nature contrastée des projets fédéralistes antérieurs et actuels dans l'UE et en 
Russie contraste: les perspectives occidentales sont moins sensibles aux priorités des 
réformes de la centralisation de la Russie, parce qu'elles sont considérées comme une 
ampliation du déficit démocratique dans les régions sans renforcer la démocratie au 
niveau national. 
Mots-clés : fédéralisme; décentalisation; démocratie; Russie;Union européenne 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The desirability and shortcomings of a federal institutional structure have been subject to intense debate 
in the European Union and post-communist Russia.  The Europeans2 are yet to agree on the prospects 
and ramifications of their common political institutions being “upgraded” to a full-blown federal state.  
Russian federalism, too, is still a project – as attested by more than a decade of roller-coaster 
center-periphery bargaining and renegotiating – that has so far failed to settle down into a stable political 
arrangement.3   Across the board, the critics of federalization have brought up a familiar list of 
grievances against the surrender of national (in the case of Europe) or central (in the case of Russia) 
authority.  Their concerns encompass the erosion of national power and sovereignty, the weakening of 
state integrity, and the undermining of governmental responsiveness and accountability.  In all of these 
accounts, traditional, hierarchically-organized national governments are maintained to offer an optimal 
organizational format for good governance and democracy.  Correspondingly, the perceived need to 
protect the prerogatives of centralized national authority has fueled anti-federalist sentiments in Russia 
and the EU.   
The degree of opposition to federalization varies from mere acknowledgements of federalism’s 
side-effects to blanket dismissals of the entire federalist alternative.  Of course, federalism has its vocal 
advocates too, but, overall, the reservations regarding the effects and utility of federalism are significant 
both in Europe (Majone 2006; Schmidt 2006) and Russia (Smirnyagin 2004).  In light of these 
widespread and seemingly similar objections to federalism, a remarkable disconnect emerges between 
the Russian and European perspectives.  While the Europeans are understandably sensitive to the 
                                                        
2 Throughout this chapter, I use the word “European” and its derivatives in a reference to Western Europe and the 
European Union.  Such usage here is motivated by matters of convenience and the need to differentiate Russia from 
the European Union; it does not intend to suggest that Russia is non-European.  The question of whether and in what 
sense Russia is a part of Europe is irrelevant to this paper.  But, since this entire volume is dedicated to issues of 
discourse, meanings, and intersubjective (dis)connections, I would like to briefly acknowledge that a common 
practice of using “Europe” to denote the European states other than Turkey and the non-Baltic republics of the 
former Soviet Union is indicative of the underlying identity fault lines.  
3 Acquired value and stability as symptoms of institutionalization are discussed in Huntington (1968).  
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problem of federalism as applied to the European Union,4 they are less accepting of anti-federalist 
arguments and the policies of recentralization taking place in Russia.  To be more specific, whereas 
Europe’s aversion to federalism is treated as a manifestation of natural growing pains stemming from 
rapid integration, Russia’s anti-federalist and recentralizing tendencies invite harsh criticism and invoke 
the specter of authoritarianism (Kuvaldin 2007: 67)  How to explain this attitudinal inconsistency?  How 
do the Europeans reconcile their ambivalence about the appropriateness of federalism in the EU with 
their lingering uneasiness with anti-federalism in Russia?   
This essay suggests that the observed divergence in the Russian and European viewpoints is rooted in 
the different frames of prevalent domestic narratives about federalism, role of the state, and the 
imperative of centralization.   In the EU case, federalism implies a qualitative institutional 
transformation, entailing political unification and the surrender of national sovereignty to an external, 
supra-national formation.  To individual member-states, federalism is a challenge from above, which, as 
the critics complain, may make the government less responsive and exacerbate the already existing 
democratic deficit.  Restricting further political integration is a remedy advocated by the European 
anti-federalists.  Russian federalism, on the other hand, has been a question of dividing power and 
autonomy between the central and regional governments, rather than an external challenge to national 
sovereignty.  In a clear departure from the European experiences, post-communist federalization has 
become associated with ad hoc bargaining, fragmentation, abuse of power, and significant 
encroachments on the national jurisdiction – all emanating from below.  From the standpoint of Russia’s 
central elite, spontaneous decentralization and federalism were destabilizing and therefore had to be 
reversed.  
Following Tversky and Kahneman’s (1986) work on the framing effect, my underlying assumption 
here is that political actors operate within specific discursive frameworks (see also Schmidt 2006; 
Statham and Gray 2005; Magnette 2003: 146).  Such frames determine the angle from which we 
approach particular issues, and function as sort of an analytical lens coloring the perception of a problem.  
The variation in discursive frameworks may be attributed to distinct historical experiences (Jo 2006; 
Schmidt 2006), especially in the area of centralization and power-sharing.  Additionally, attitudes toward 
federalism may be affected by the dominant political institutions and the trajectory of their development.  
The earlier experiences shape up political expectations about the future that, through the process of 
internalization, fossilize into political cultures and frame up the course of the current debate.  This paper 
argues that the contrasting nature of prior and ongoing federalist projects in the EU and Russia matters: 
the Western perspective is less sympathetic to the priorities of Russia’s centralization reforms, because 
they are viewed as amplifying democratic deficit in the regions without enhancing democracy at the 
national level. 
The rest of the article develops the above themes by outlining the divergent interpretations of 
federalism and its impact on governance and democracy in the European Union and Russia.  I start by 
comparing these two federative projects and then discuss the problem of democratic deficit.  
 
2.  THE CONTRASTING NATURE OF THE FEDERALIST 
PROJECTS IN THE E.U. AND RUSSIA 
 
A federal bargain involves the division of authority among several autonomous segments of the 
government.  Invariably, this implies restructuring power and authority of the state, particularly its center.  
But there are substantive distinctions between the Russian and EU cases, the most noticeable of which 
are the opposing vectors of the reform.  In terms of the direction and magnitude of institutional change, 
federalization may take on two distinct forms:  it either requires a partitioning of national sovereignty for 
its subsequent redistribution from the national center to the periphery, or it entails a partial surrender of 
sovereignty to a newly devised center.  The former is federalization by devolution, and the latter is 
                                                        
4 Marquand (2006: 179) even brands the British attitude as “neurotic aversion”. 
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federalization by aggregation (Trechsel 2005: 404).  The two are differentiated by the starting point, the 
ultimate objective of political reorganization, and the bargaining power of the involved actors.  The 
difference is not trivial.  The Russian and EU federalisms are dissimilar projects; different reform 
agendas, in turn, translate into contrasting assessments of federalism, its challenges, effects, and utility.  
Undoubtedly, the Europeans have grown accustomed to the idea of incremental economic and 
political integration those chips away at the vestiges of the Westphalian international system in Europe 
replacing it with a supranational order.  Even the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 
referendums – a definite setback in that process – is unlikely to arrest the integrationist impetus, 
generated by the earlier rounds of unification and the evolutionary logic of the EU institutions.  But 
while the borders within Europe are gradually withering away, federalization remains a fundamental and 
yet unprecedented challenge.  A federal union can only be achieved through discontinuous institutional 
change, altering the very essence of the European system of governance and involving nothing less than 
the creation of a genuine common government with a unique, compulsory, and overarching jurisdiction.  
It is thus a state-building venture that inevitably evokes comparisons to the founding of the United States 
of America out of a political compact between the original thirteen colonies.   
The Russian federal reforms of the past two decades were, too, aimed at state-building.  But the 
difference between the two cases is crucial.  Despite a high degree of intra-European unity, federalism 
for the EU originates as an issue of international politics.  First of all, the primary participants in 
negotiating any deal will be the member states.  Granted, Europe already possesses a post-national, 
proto-federal center consisting of the common EU institutions that act in their own right and influence 
further integration.  Nevertheless, the states remain the formal source of authority (Hallstrom 2003: 54), 
and various national level actors retain the power to veto the process (Trechsel 2006: 407-409; Benz 
2004).5  Secondly, the debate on EU federalism is inevitably related to international affairs, because at 
its core is the question of sovereignty, a central concern in international, rather than domestic context.  
From the standpoint of individual EU member-states, federalization requires creating a government 
above them and irreversibly relinquishing to that purpose a degree of their sovereignty.6  As a matter of 
fact, under a federal arrangement it would make no sense to describe the residual competencies of the 
member-states in terms of sovereignty.  Sovereign discretion will be sacrificed to be replaced with 
bounded, albeit possibly quite extensive, territorial autonomy.   
The earlier rounds of integration were also premised on an explicit surrender of sovereignty 
(Hallstrom 2003: 65), but never in its entirety.  The irrevocable finality of abandoning the comfort zone 
of sovereign statehood provokes the antifederalist reaction, particularly in Great Britain (Marquand 2006; 
Schmidt 2006; Statham and Gray 2005).  Even under a decentralized arrangement, the currently 
sovereign states will become autonomous territories, national executives will, in effect, be demoted to 
the rank of governors, and, likewise, the national parliaments will turn into regional legislatures.  Such 
modifications clash with the resilient tradition of independent national executive power, based on the 
Hobbesian conceptualization of sovereignty or, in the case of the U.K, in the deep-seated notions of 
parliamentary supremacy (Marquand 2006, 179-181; Schmidt 2006: 28). 
While in Europe federalism emerges as an external challenge to statehood and national identity, 
Russian federalism has been a question of redistributing power and authority through devolution.   Under 
this scenario, the principal actors are different.  A clearly defined and authoritative federal center already 
exists and features prominently in the bargaining.  On the other side of the table are the regions, which 
may boast some administrative discretion or even partial autonomy, but not sovereignty in the sense 
                                                        
5 As observed by Trechsel (2006: 407-409), the unanimity requirement in the EU decision-making and the growing 
number of the veto players attributed to the recent rounds of European enlargement have only increased the 
likelihood of future deadlocks. 
6 The proposed EU Constitution allowed for unilateral secession, but, as Trechsel (2005: 405-406) observes, leaving 
the union would be extremely difficult.  The experience of the USA and the Russian Federation further suggests that, 
as the federal states coalesce and mature, they tend to discard the right to secession.  There are, of course, notable 
examples of quasi-federal multinational states falling apart under the weight of a systemic crisis and setting their 
component units free.  But save for such extreme circumstances, unilateral withdrawals from a relatively stable state 
appear to be prohibitively costly.  Once you are in, getting out is likely to be problematic.  Therefore the surrender of 
sovereignty should better be treated as permanent.   
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applied to the current EU members.  The stakes in this game are different too: it is a question of internally 
reshuffling the jurisdictions, rather than aggregating the existing independent competencies into a new 
state.  With the exception of instances of attempted secession, national sovereignty is not at issue: the 
object of bargaining is the distribution of power and authority.  Russian federalism thus is best 
conceptualized as a tug-of-war between the center and the periphery (with the center pulling more 
forcefully in the recent years) that is a matter of domestic politics outside the purview of international 
affairs. 
Typically, only some of the regional players take the initiative in asserting their rights and pressuring 
the center for concessions, whereas the rest tend to adopt a wait-and-see strategy, ready to jump on the 
bandwagon of decentralization when the center relents, but reluctant to be confrontational from the onset 
or if the center regains its strength.  When federalism is driven by devolution, the bargaining power of a 
regional player that translates into a larger share of spoils from the redistribution of authority depends on 
its ability to issue credible separatist threats (Mitin 2003).7  But even when the openly defiant regions 
are few and the silent, yet opportunistic, majority predominates, the combined regional demands can 
significantly distress the center and, if left unchecked, threaten the integrity of the state.  To the national 
center, federalism thus represents a serious challenge from below.  It is notable that some of the Russian 
regions brought up the slogan of independence, triggering the so-called parade of sovereignties in 
1990-1991.8  Such declarations simultaneously reflected an erroneous understanding of the concept of 
sovereignty (an autonomy declaration would have been more appropriate)9 and the determination of the 
select regions to push for a privileged status.  The language of sovereignty also skewed the tracks of the 
center-periphery debate in Russia in a more conflictual direction, setting the two sides on a collision 
course. 
Federalization by aggregation and federalization through devolution represent two distinct projects, 
characterized by contrasting reform agendas and, as particularly germane to this article, different 
versions of myths, norms and identities regarding the value of federalism, the importance of the center, 
the role of the state, and the preferred degree of centralization.  In the situations of aggregation, as with 
the USA, Switzerland, and the EU, the greatest hurdle, at least initially, is reaching the consensus on the 
need for a common center and then agreeing on its scope.  When power and authority are devolved, 
especially under duress, the issue of legitimacy and extent of devolution may remain unresolved, while 
the longing for the centralized state and the myths of the center’s prominence persist.10 
The above discussion already hints at a possible explanation for the divergence between the EU and 
Russian perspectives.  From the standpoint of Russia’s national elites, post-communist federalization 
proceeded as an opportunistic dismantling of the hierarchy of power and authority, facilitated by 
Moscow’s temporary weakness and driven mainly by threats of separatism from below.  Such concerns 
are outside the frame of the European federal debate.  Being the opposite of fragmentation, political 
unification of Europe jeopardizes the sovereignty of the participating states, but not their internal 
integrity.  As a result, federalization by devolution, so alarming to the Russian center, is not recognized 
in the European capitals to be a serious problem.  Even the Euro-skeptics, who dispute the 
appropriateness of federalism for Europe, may easily be supportive of devolution at home.  The 
experience of Britain is instructive here.  Formally unitary, the United Kingdom operates basically as a 
federal state, especially following the 1998 concessions to Scotland (Marquand 2006: 180). 11  
Symptomatically, the British elites are little bothered by internal decentralization, but they remain wary 
                                                        
7 Quebec in Canada or the ethnic republics in Russia come to mind.  Incidentally, support for federalism in the EU 
case has been reported to be partly a function of the state’s size with the smaller actors, in a sort of a balancing act, 
favoring political integration to compensate for their relative weakness vis-à-vis the larger, more powerful states 
(Hallstrom 2003: 65-69).   
8 Twenty-four regions in the Russian Federation adopted a sovereignty declaration from August 1990 through May 
1991.  
9 The “Euro-skeptics” likewise cling on to the notion of sovereignty, which at times results in illogical propositions, 
like Chirac’s description of Europe in terms of a “federation of nation states” (as reported in Schmidt 2006: 27) – 
“states” apparently in the traditional sense, rather than as mere American or India-style provinces.  
10 See Pipes (2004) on the continuity of Russia’s political culture. 
11 Ironically, in Russia the opposite is true: formally federal, the state has recently become not simply centralized, 
but, for all intents and purposes, unitary. 
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of the external challenges to sovereignty emanating from the European integration.   
 
3.  CENTRALIZATION, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND 
DEMOCRACY 
 
The dissimilarity in the nature of the federalist projects, discussed in the previous section, translates into 
different perceptions of the effects and utility of federalism.  An obvious disconnect between the 
dominant Russian and EU perspectives has emerged in such issue areas as the impact of federalization 
on governmental efficacy, accountability, the level of centralization, and the state of democracy.   
Centralization is an inescapable ramification of European federalism.  A federal bargain for the EU 
necessitates a transformation of the presently state-centered system into a political union that will be 
more bounded and possess a clearly defined center.  At this point one can only speculate how centralized 
Europe may eventually become.  It can start just as the United States did – a polity with a relatively 
constrained center and broad regional discretion.  But like the American federation before it, Europe may 
eventually undergo rapid centralization culminating in an overbearing core and subordinated provinces.  
The prospects of an incremental, yet unstoppable slide towards overcentralization have become a 
mobilizing issue for the critics of federalism.  The British political elites, especially, have been insistent 
on painting the image of a distant, inflexible, and imposing superstate materializing from federalization.  
Such negative assessments are grounded in the general neoliberal distrust of the regulatory state,12 the 
uncertainties of post-sovereign existence, and, partly, in legitimate concerns over the excessive 
concentration of power in a supranational entity (Marquand 2006; Schmidt 2006).  The advocates of 
political integration attempt to deflate the fear of consolidation by highlighting the decentralizing 
essence of federalism (see Marquand 2006: 176-177).  Such rebuttals, however, miss the point.  
Federalism may not necessarily lead to a superstate, so alarming to the British politicians.  But, by its 
very nature, aggregation entails centralization.  Regardless of how nonhierarchical Europe remains at 
first, power and authority will still be more tightly packed, compared to the current arrangement, and 
there will always remain a potential for the expansion of the center’s scope.  
Russian federalism, of course, has generated the opposite concern.  If an increase in the degree of 
centralization is the price that the Europeans have to pay for a union, Russia’s post-communist 
federalization could only be predicated on the introduction of partial but, with any luck, controlled 
disunity.  Given the overcentralized nature of the Soviet Union, that was the only direction in which 
institutional change could proceed.  While a contraction of the center was all but inevitable, its extent 
could vary.  As we now know, the center-periphery balance in Russia swung madly from one extreme – 
that of a streamlined, domineering hierarchy – to another, spawning threats of separatism and secession 
in the process and jeopardizing the very integrity of the state.  Ironically, the outcome of Russia’s 
devolution in the 1990s was the mirror image of what the British critics of federalism predict to be the 
worst case scenario for the EU: instead of an absolutist superstate, runaway decentralization in Russia 
resulted in what Vladimir Shlapentokh (2003) has aptly called feudalization, the dynamics of political 
fragmentation and the dismantling of the Hobbesian order (see also Muller 2003).   
To Yeltsin’s credit, it may be argued that his brand of federalism functioned as sort of an elastic band 
that allowed the regions and the center to pull in the opposite directions, while holding them all together.  
With the exception of Chechnya, Yeltsin’s spontaneous and asymmetric concessions proved effective at 
allowing the steam to escape, preventing the worst kinds of inter-jurisdictional confrontations.  But even 
from that angle, the profound devolution of power and authority that took place after the Soviet collapse 
appears to have been a temporary solution, rather than a deliberate recalibration of the system of 
governance.  The Putin administration made the retightening of the center’s grip on power one of its top 
                                                        
12 The neoliberal bias was succinctly expressed in Margaret Thatcher’s 1988 reference to deregulation: “We have 
not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them re-imposed at a European level” (as 
quoted in Schmidt 2006: 23). 
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priorities.  Reimposing the Moscow-dominated vertical hierarchy of authority was hailed as a solution to 
such problems as political instability, governmental ineffectiveness, abuse of power, and corruption.  
Once the center had stabilized, the anti-federalist reaction, aimed at rectifying the perceived excesses of 
uncontrolled decentralization, immediately followed.   
The consecutive reversals of federalization under president Putin reflect a significant separation 
between the Russian and EU perspectives on federalism.  In Russia, disintegration and state failure were 
blamed on the ad hoc concessions to the regions and the weakness of the center.  The imperative of 
building a strong and effective national state, influenced by the traditionally monocentric model of 
governance, translated into the unwillingness to share discretionary power and authority and the ultimate 
rejection of devolution.  In a striking contrast, Europe’s relatively weak center, asymmetric 
implementation schemes, and a tradition of polycentric governance (Trechsel 2005: 205; Hallstrom 2003: 
56), means that federalization there would enhance the unity and accomplish greater harmony.  
Furthermore, the failings at the level of a nation state produced the reaction opposite to Russia’s and 
generated greater support for federalism as a viable state-building alternative (Schmidt 2006: 29-30).  
Notably, the position of the incumbent Russian elites is at variance not only with the advocates of 
European federalism, but also with its antagonists, since the latter are wary of integration through 
centralization, particularly in the absence of clear accountability lines.13 
Further setting the Russian and EU positions apart is the issue of democracy as a function of 
federalism.  The common perception in Russia is that, overall, federalization had little positive effect on 
the state of democracy.  As observed by many commentators, the devolution of power from the center to 
the periphery failed to facilitate democratic governance and, paradoxically, recreated the familiar 
patterns of arbitrariness and authoritarianism at the lower levels (e.g., Lapina 1998).  What has been 
dubbed as local totalitarianism became a pervasive feature of the Russian political landscape.  
Oftentimes, the incumbents treated the regions as their personal fiefdoms.  A symptom of that was the 
emergence of the hierarchical patterns of power distribution within the regions very similar to those in 
the overcentralized Soviet system.  The sad irony of Russia's federalism consisted in the fact that the 
local leaders proved as unwilling to compromise and share power with anybody else as their counterparts 
in the center.  In effect, by pursuing a centralized system of subordination and control for the 
governments below them, the regions became the center in miniature.  That, in turn, gave rise to the 
widespread allegations of local tyranny and abuse of power.  Thus the experience with federalism 
appears to have only strengthened the general disenchantment with democracy in the Russian Federation.  
When, following its antifederalist agenda, the center reverted to appointing the regional executives, the 
Russian public turned out to be largely indifferent to that fundamental reversal of regional democracy.  
The issue of democracy is probably the most contentious point in the Russian-European dialogue.  
The problem of democratic deficit arising from integration continues to worry the national elites in many 
EU member states (Crum 2005; Magnette 2003; Marquand 2006).  Once again, the Russian position is 
incompatible with the viewpoints of both the Euro-skeptics and the advocates of federalization.  The 
antifederalists believe the nation state to be an optimal vessel for representative democracy.  They are 
therefore concerned that political integration, an essential component of federalism, will only exacerbate 
the existing democratic deficit by making the government more distant and less responsive to the people.  
Opposing the aggrandizement of the European Leviathan and concomitant centralization is the 
prescription they advocate.  In response, the supporters of federalism argue that establishing an elective 
federal government will immediately resolve the problem of insufficient democracy at the European 
level.  To them, federalism is the most effective instrument for promoting democracy.  In an interesting 
twist, Majone (2006) suggests that the opposition to the supranational federal state in Europe is a 
reflection of robust democratic politics in the member states, and that democratic deficit at the EU level 
may be offset by reducing the scope of the European institutions (607-608).   Whatever side in the 
intra-European debate we take, democracy is treated as a goal in and of itself, while unwarranted and 
opaque centralization schemes are universally opposed.   
 
 
                                                        
13 See Majone 2006 (213) on the dangers of “cryptofederalism” or “integration by stealth”.  
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4.  THE CLASH OF PERSPECTIVES? 
 
Freedom is an element of the “common space” to be established between the EU and Russia.  And yet 
liberty has been increasingly perceived to be in decline in Russia.14  If Yeltsin’s regime appeared 
weakened, destabilized, and unpredictable, Putin’s Russia is viewed as internally illiberal, externally 
assertive, and, in a way, more distant.   The dismantling of Russia’s asymmetric federalism – a most 
visible aspect of Putin’s reform – has come to symbolize the reversal of Russia’s earlier democratic 
achievements.  When it comes to the evaluation of recent political reforms, the scholars and practitioners 
on both sides of the Atlantic emphasize Russia’s transformation into the so-called hybrid regime – 
quasi-democratic in form, but increasingly authoritarian in terms of its contents and modus operandi. 
The outside observers of Russian politics have been particularly suspicious of the real intentions and 
long-term consequences of Putin’s federal reforms, focusing much of their analytic rigor on the 
discussion of the deleterious effects of de-federalization and recentralization.   
Russia’s concerns over the negative effects of devolution are quite legitimate and definitely not unique.  
But, as the current findings indicate, there is a substantial divergence in the discourse over comparative 
advantages and disadvantages of federalism, rooted in the distinct and path-dependent trajectories of 
Russia’s and EU’s institutional development.  The bottom line is this: the Europeans are less sympathetic 
to the idea of dismantling federalism as an integrationist tool, because their experience with federalism is 
fundamentally different.  Federalism in Europe has not gained a reputation of an internal threat.  Hence, 
Europe’s rather critical attitude toward the purported imperatives of Russia’s centralization. 
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